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DISCLAIMERS OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES: THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS
INTRODUCTION

The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods' (CISG or Convention) is before the Foreign Rela1. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CISG],
reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980). The Convention's genesis can be traced to the 1930's,
when the League of Nations commissioned the Rome International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (-tNIDROIT) to prepare a uniform law on international sales of
goods. See Historical Introduction to the Draft Convention for the International Sale of
Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat paras. 1-2, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Historical Introduction], reprintedin United Nations Conference on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official Records paras. 1-2, at 3-4, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Official Records]; J. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention § 4, at 49
(1982); Farnsworth, Formation of Contract, in International Sales: The United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods § 3.02, at 3-3 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Farnsworth I]; Farnsworth, The Vienna Convention: History and Scope,
18 Int'l Law. 17, 17 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Farnsworth II]; Reinhart, Development of
a Law for the InternationalSale of Goods, 14 Cum. L. Rev. 89, 92-93 (1984); Sono, UNCITRAL and the Vienna Sales Convention, 18 Int'l Law. 7, 12 (1984); Winship, The
Scope of the Vienna Convention on InternationalSales Contracts, in International Sales:
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
§ 1.01[1], at 1-4 to -5 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Winship I]; Winship, New Rules for
InternationalSales, 68 A.B.A. J. 1231, 1231 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Winship II];
Note, A Practitioner'sGuide to the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 16 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 81, 85 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Practitioner'sGuide]; Note, Trade Usages in InternationalSales of Goods.: An Analysis of
the 1964 and 1980 Sales Conventions, 24 Va. J. Int'l L. 619, 630 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Trade Usages]. UNIDROIT attempted to unify this area of law. The Second World
War caused the project to lay dormant until 1951, when the government of the Netherlands convened a conference of twenty-one nations at the Hague to resuscitate it. Historical Introduction, supra, para. 3, at 7, reprinted in Official Records, supra, para. 3, at 4;
Farnsworth II, supra, at 17; Reinhart, supra, at 93; Winship I, supra, § 1.01(2], at 1-7 to
-8; Practitioner'sGuide, supra, at 85. Committees were formed to re-examine and revise
pre-existing drafts of a uniform law on international sales. These efforts culminated in
the 1964 Hague Conference. Historical Introduction, supra, paras. 3-4, at 7, reprinted in
Official Records, supra, paras. 3-4, at 4; J. Honnold, supra, § 4, at 49; Farnsworth I,
supra, § 3.02, at 3-3; Farnsworth II, supra, at 17; Reinhart, supra, at 93; Winship I, supra,
§ 1.01[2]-[3], at 1-8 to -9; Practitioner'sGuide, supra, at 85. This conference produced the
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the
Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (ULFIS). Historical Introduction, supra, paras. 5-6, at 7-8, reprintedin Official Records, supra, paras. 5-6, at 4; J.
Honnold, supra, § 4, at 49; American Bar Ass'n, Report to the House of Delegates, 18 Int'l
Law. 39, 40 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report]; Farnsworth I, supra, § 3.02, at 3-3;
Farnsworth II, supra, at 17; Reinhart, supra, at 93; Winship I, supra, § 1.0113], at 1-9 to
-12; Practitioner'sGuide, supra, at 85; Trade Usages, supra, at 620, 630. The text of the
ULIS may be found in the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter cited as ULIS], reprintedin 3 I.L.M. 855
(1964); that of the ULFIS may be fcund in the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on
the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 169, re-
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tions Committee of the United States Senate awaiting consideration for
printed in 3 I.L.M. 864 (1964). These conventions entered into force in 1972 after ratification by five countries. Historical Introduction, supra,para. 7, at 8, reprintedin Official
Records, supra, para. 7, at 4; J. Honnold, supra, § 4, at 49; ABA Report, supra, at 40-41;
Winship I, supra, § 1.01[3], at 1-13; Winship II, supra, at 1231; Practitioner'sGuide,
supra, at 85; Trade Usages, supra, at 630. They are in effect today in Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Gambia, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, San Maoino
and the United Kingdom. Historical Introduction, supra, para. 7, at 8, reprinted in
Official Records, supra, para. 7, at 4; Farnsworth I, supra, § 3.02, at 3-3 & n.3; Farnsworth II, supra, at 17-18; Reinhart, supra,at 93; Winship I, supra, § 1.01[3], at 1-13 n.25;
Winship II, supra, at 1231. Notwithstanding acceptance by these countries, the impact
that these conventions have had on international trade has been minimal. Winship I,
supra, § 1.01[3], at 1-13; Winship II, supra, at 1231; Practitioner'sGuide, supra, at 85; see
ABA Report, supra, at 41 (conventions not widely adopted). The 1964 Conference was
dominated by the Western industrialized nations. See Sono, supra, at 13. Many developing nations refused to ratify the conventions because of what they perceived to be a European bias. See Reinhart, supra, at 94; Winship, Formation of International Sales
Contracts under the 1980 Vienna Convention, 17 Int'l Law. 1, 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Winship III]; Winship II, supra, at 1232; cf Practitioner'sGuide, supra, at 86 (American delegates noted bias against developing nations). The United States did not ratify
either convention. See ABA Report, supra, at 41; Farnsworth II, supra, at 17; Winship II,
supra, at 1232. This was due mainly to a lack of American influence and participation in
the drafting of these conventions. The United States at that time was more concerned
with preserving the success of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). See Reinhart,
supra, at 93-94. Consequently, it did not join UNIDROIT until three months before the
1964 Conference. Winship II, supra, at 1232; see Farnsworth II, supra, at 17. This general lack of support made it apparent that wide-spread adoption of the Hague conventions was unlikely. J. Honnold, supra, § 9, at 53; Winship I, supra, § 1.01[3], at 1-12 to
-13; Winship II, supra, at 1232; Trade Usages, supra, at 620-21; see also J. Honnold,
supra, § 5, at 49-50 (conviction that world-wide success depended on world-wide participation led to establishment of United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)); Farnsworth I, supra, § 3.02, at 3-3 (UNCITRAL was revising the conventions even before they came into effect); Farnsworth II, supra, at 18 (same). UNCITRAL was established by the General Assembly in 1966 "to take such steps as would
• . . further the harmonization and unification of international trade law." Report
of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Second Session to the General Assembly, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) para. 16, at 7,
U.N. Doc. A/7618 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Second Session Report], reprinted in
[1970] 1 Y.B. UNCITRAL para. 16, at 97, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970 [hereinafter
cited as Yearbook 11. For a discussion of the structure and workings of UNCITRAL, see
J. Honnold, supra, §§ 5-8, at 49-52. At its first session in 1968, UNCITRAL sent inquiries to various nations to determine their intentions with respect to the 1964 conventions.
Historical Introduction, supra, para. 8, at 8, reprintedin Official Records, supra, para. 8,
at 4; Winship I, supra, § 1.01[4], at 1-13. After receiving these replies, UNCITRAL, at
its second session in 1969, created a working group to determine whether any adaptations
or modifications of the 1964 Uniform Laws were possible, or whether a completely new
text should be drafted. Historical Introduction, supra, para. 9, at 8-9, reprintedin Official
Records, supra, para. 9, at 4; Winship I, supra, § 1.01[4], at 1-13; see J. Honnold, supra,
§ 9, at 53; ABA Report, supra, at 41; Farnsworth II, supra, at 18; Reinhart, supra, at 94.
There were numerous discussions on this subject. See Historical Introduction, supra,
para. 10, at 9, reprintedin Official Records, supra, para. 10, at 4; Report of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Fifth Session to the
General Assembly, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) para. 27, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/8717
(1972), reprinted in [1972] 3 Y.B. UNCITRAL para. 27, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/
SER.A/1972 [hereinafter cited as Yearbook 3]; Report of the Sixth Committee to the
General Assembly, 26 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 87) para. 24, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/8506
(1972), reprinted in Yearbook 3, supra, para. 24, at 6; Second Session Report, supra,
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paras. 22-25, at 8, para. 30, at 9, reprinted in Yearbook 1, supra, paras. 22-25, 30, at 9798; Report of the Sixth Committee of the Trade and Development Board, United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development, to the General Assembly, 24 U.N. GAOR
(Agenda Item 90) paras. 17-18, at 9-10, U.N. Doe. A/7747 (1969), reprintedin Yearbook
1, supra, paras. 17-18, at 124. It was decided that the better choice would be to devise
new texts. Winship I, supra, § 1.01[4], at 1-13. Several drafts were produced between
1970 and 1978. Id. at 1-13 to -14; Winship II, supra, at 1232. These drafts
were the results of working group discussions. See generally Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Eleventh Session to the
General Assembly, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) Annex I paras. 44-46, at 65-66 (1978)
(summary of Commission deliberations regarding article 5 of 1978 Draft Convention)
[hereinafter cited as Eleventh Session Report], reprinted in [1978] 9 Y.B. UNCITRAL
paras. 44-46, at 35, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978 [hereinafter cited as Yearbook 9];
Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
its Tenth Session to the General Assembly, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) Annex I
paras. 74, 76, at 54-55, paras. 138-40, at 65, paras. 145-47, at 66-67, U.N. Doe. A/32/17
(1977) (examples of Working Group deliberations and decisions on articles of the Draft
Convention) [hereinafter cited as Tenth Session Report], reprinted in [1977] 8 Y.B. UNCITRAL paras. 74, 76, at 30, paras. 138-40, at 34, paras. 145-47, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/SER.A/1977 [hereinafter cited as Yearbook 8]; Report of the Working Group on
the International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Seventh Session to UNCITRAL,
Annex II paras. 1-3, at 12, para. 1, at 27, paras. 3-9, at 28-29, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/116
(1976) (examples of Working Group commentaries on articles of the Draft Convention)
[hereinafter cited as Commentary, Working Group Seventh Session], reprintedin [1976] 7
Y.B. UNCITRAL paras. 1-3, at 100, paras. 1, 3-9, at 107, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/
1976 [hereinafter cited as Yearbook 7]; Progress Report of the Working Group on the
International Sale of Goods on the Work of its Fourth Session to UNCITRAL para. 39,
at 9, para. 42, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/75 (1973) (examples of discussions by Working
Group regarding articles of draft of Convention) [hereinafter cited as Progress Report,
Working Group Fourth Session], reprintedin [1973] 4 Y.B. UNCITRAL paras. 39, 42, at
64, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A/1973 [hereinafter cited as Yearbook 4]; Report of the
Working Group on the International Sale of Goods, First Session, to UNCITRAL paras.
57-60, at 14-15, paras. 63-64, 66, 68, 70, at 16-17, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/35 (1970) (early
discussions of Working Group on article 17 of ULIS) [hereinafter cited as Report, Working Group First Session], reprinted in Yearbook 1, supra, paras. 57-60, 63-64, 66, 68, at
182, para. 70, at 183; Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law on the Work of its Third Session to the General Assembly, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 17) paras. 53-54, at 15, paras. 60-63, at 16-17, U.N. Doc. A/8017 (1970) (same, and
discussions of ULIS article 5(2)) [hereinafter cited as Third Session Report], reprintedin
Yearbook 1, supra, paras. 53-54, at 136, paras. 60-63, at 136-37. Commentaries and
recommendations from different countries and agencies were also influential in the drafting of these texts. See ABA Report, supra, at 41; Winship II, supra, at 1232. See generally
Analysis of Comments and Proposals by Governments and International Organizations
on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, and on Draft
Provisions Concerning Implementation, Reservations and Other Final Clauses, Prepared
by the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/9 (1980) (analysis of comments and
proposals submitted to 1980 Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
by different governments and international organizations) [hereinafter cited as Analysis
of Comments, 1980 Conference], reprinted in Official Records, supra, at 71; Analysis of
Comments by Governments and International Organizations on the Draft Convention on
the International Sale of Goods as Adopted by the Working Group on the International
Sale of Goods: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/126 (1977) (analysis
of comments submitted to Working Group by different countries and international organizations) [hereinafter cited as Analysis of Comments, Working Group], reprinted in
Yearbook 8, supra, at 142-43; Comments by Governments and International Organizations on the Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods at 1, U.N. Does. A/
CN.9/125, A/CN.9/125/Add.1, and A/CN.9/125/Add.2 (1977) (compilation of com-
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ratification. 2 The Convention applies to international transactions 3 bements received by the Working Group from various governments and international organizations) [hereinafter cited as Comments by Governments], reprinted in Yearbook 8,
supra, at 109; Analysis of Comments and Proposals Relating to Articles 1-17 of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS): Note by the Secretary-General,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.11 (1971) (comments by countries on first 17 articles of
the ULIS) [hereinafter cited as Analysis of Comments, Articles 1-17], reprinted in Yearbook 3, supra, at 69; Analysis of the Studies and Comments by Governments on the
Hague Conventions of 1964: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/31
(1970) (analysis of first set of responses received by UNCITRAL as to the 1964 Uniform
Laws) [hereinafter cited as Analysis of Studies], reprinted in Yearbook 1, supra, at 159.
In 1978, a draft Convention was adopted by UNCITRAL, Historical Introduction,
supra, para. 11, at 9-10, reprinted in Official Records, supra, para. 11, at 4-5; see J. Honnold, supra, § 9, at 53-54; ABA Report, supra, at 41; Winship I, supra, § 1.01[4], at I14; Winship II, supra, at 1232, for presentation at the 97th Diplomatic Conference of the
United Nations, see Reinhart, supra, at 94-95. This conference met in Vienna from
March 10 to April 11, 1980. ABA Report,supra, at 39. After lengthy committee discussions, see Summary Records of the First Committee (14th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.97/C. I/SR. 14 (1980) (example of discussions of a Convention article by the First
Committee) in Official Records, supra, paras. 29-30, at 308; Summary Records of the
First Committee (6th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.6 (1980) (same) in Official
Records, supra, at 259, paras. 7, 10, at 260, paras. 33, 35, at 261; Summary Records of
the First Committee (5th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.5 (1980) (same) [hereinafter cited as Summary Records, First Committee, Fifth Meeting], in Official Records,
supra, at 254-59, and reports, see Report of the First Committee to the Plenary Conference (6th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/SR.6 (1980) (examples of committee reports and voting on different articles) [hereinafter cited as Report, First Committee, Sixth
Plenary Meeting], in Official Records, supra, paras. 23-30, at 201, paras. 37-45, at 202,
paras. 37, 45-46, at 207, para. 53, at 208; Report of the First Committee to the Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, at 8-10, 13-18, 63-67, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/11 (1980) (proposed amendments to certain articles) [hereinafter cited as
Report, First Committee], reprintedin Official Records, supra, at 85-88, 103-05, the Convention was adopted by the 62 attending nations, Reinhart, supra, at 94-95; Winship 1,
supra, § 1.01[4], at 1-14; Practitioner'sGuide, supra, at 81-82 & n.8.
2. As of August 7, 1984, the Convention had been ratified or acceded to by six countries: Argentina, Egypt, France, Hungary, Lesotho and Syria. Memorandum from Peter
H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Members of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law
and its former Study Group on International Sales, and Others at 2 (Aug. 7, 1984) (available in files of Fordham Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. Austria,
Czechoslovakia, the People's Republic of China, Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia are among
those countries currently considering ratification. Id. The Convention will become effective one year after ratification by a tenth state. CISG, supra note 1, art. 99(1), at 31,
reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 694 (1980); see Winship, Introduction, InternationalSale of
Goods, 18 Int'l Law. 3, 3 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Winship IV]; Practitioner'sGuide,
supra note 1, at 81; Trade Usages, supra note 1, at 622 n. 13. The Convention is likely to
enter into force within the foreseeable future. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Seventeenth Session to the General
Assembly, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) paras. 145-46, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/39/17
(1984); Analysis of Comments, 1980 Conference, supra note 1, paras. 1-2, at 2-3, reprinted in Official Records, supra note 1, paras. 1-2, at 71; Sono, supra note 1, at 14;
Winship II, supra note 1, at 1234. The likelihood of ratification by other states will
greatly increase if the United States ratifies the Convention. See Pfund, Prospectsfor
Adoption in the United States, in International Sales: The United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 10-7 (1984); Sono, supra note 1, at 14;
Winship IV, supra, at 4; Memorandum, supra, at 2. President Reagan submitted the
Convention to the Senate on September 21, 1983. Pfund, supra, at 10-4; Winship IV,
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tween merchants4 for the sale of goods. 5 Certain issues raised by such
transactions, however, are specifically excluded from its scope. 6 For exsupra, at 3 n.2; Practitioner'sGuide, supra note 1, at 82; Trade Usages, supra note 1, at
622. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held public hearings on April 4, 1984.
See InternationalSale of Goods, Proposed United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the
InternationalSale of Goods: Hearing on Treaty Do. 9 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearing]. The
prospects are good for eventual Senate ratification. See Pfund, supra, at 10-5 to -6; Trade
Usages, supra note 1, at 622; see also ABA Report, supra note 1, at 40, 50-51 (noting
benefits to U.S. of ratification); Winship II, supra note 1, at 1234 (same). Many American legal and trade organizations support ratification of the Convention. See Senate
Hearing,supra, at 8 (statement of Peter H. Pfund, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private
Int'l Law, Dep't of State), 15 (same), 31-32 (statement of Peter H. Kaskell, Chairman,
Lawyers Comm. for the Convention on Contracts for the Int'l Sale of Goods); ABA Report, supra note 1, at 39, 51; Winship IV, supra, at 3-4. But see Senate Hearing,supra, at
38-40 (statement of Frank A. Orban III, International Counsel, Armstrong World Indus., Inc.) (arguments against ratification); Rosett, CriticalReflections on the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 45 Ohio St. UJ. 265,
267, 272-73, 295, 303-05 (1984) (same). Even if the Senate does not ratify the Convention, it may still apply by virtue of article l(l)(b) to contracts to which a United States
trader is a party. See Winship III, supra note 1, at 2 n.3, 3 n.6. See infra note 36 and
accompanying text.
3. An "international transaction" under the Convention is a transaction involving a
sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different countries. CISG,
supra note 1, art. 1(1), reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 672 (1980); see J. Honnold, supra note
1, §§ 12-13, at 57-58, § 40, at 78. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
4. The Convention specifically excludes from its application any sales "of goods
bought for personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at
the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods
were bought for any such use." CISG, supra note 1, art. 2(a), at 2, reprintedin 19 I.L.M.
668, 672 (1980). The Convention will govern only transactions between professionals.
Id., reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 672. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
5. The Convention does not explicitly define "goods." Rather, article 2 excludes
from its coverage items which are not goods. See Winship I, supra note 1, § 1.02[3][c], at
1-25. A sale of goods does not include sales "of stocks, shares, investment securities,
negotiable instruments or money," CISG, supra note 1, art. 2(d), at 2, reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 668, 672 (1980), "of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft," id., art. 2(e), at 2, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 672, or "of electricity," id., art. 2(0, at 2, reprintedin 19 I.LM. at
672. See J. Honnold, supra note 1, §§ 53-55, at 88-89. The Convention also excludes
contracts for the manufacture and sale of goods, if "the preponderant part of the obligations of the party who furnishes the goods consists in the supply of labour or other services." CISG, supra note 1, art. 3(2), at 2, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 672; see J. Honnold,
supra note 1, § 60, at 92-93. Other transactions that are excluded from the Convention
are auction sales, and sales on execution or otherwise by authority of law. CISG, supra
note 1, art. 2(b), (c), at 2, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 672; see J. Honnold, supra note 1,
§§ 51-52, at 87-88.
6. See Farnsworth II, supra note 1, at 19; Practitioner'sGuide, supra note 1, at 88.
The Convention excludes issues concerning the validity of the contract, its provisions, or
any usages. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a), at 2, reprinted in 19 .LM. 668, 673
(1980); J. Honnold, supra note 1, §64, at 96; ABA Report, supra note 1, at 42; Reinhart,
supra note 1, at 96; Rosett, supra note 2, at 280; Samson, La Convention des Nations
Unies sur les contrats de vente internationalede marchandises Etude comparativede dispositions de la Convention et des regles de droit qudbdcois en la matire, 23 Les Cahiers de
Droit [C. de D.] 919, 929 (1982); Winship I, supra note 1, § 1.02[6], at 1-36. The Convention also excludes matters concerning the effect that the contract may have on the
property rights in the goods sold, see CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(b), at 2, reprinted in 19
I.L.M. at 673; J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 70, at 99; Reinhart, supra note 1, at 96; see
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ample, if the domestic law that would govern the contract absent the

Convention places in question "the validity of the contract or of any of
its provisions," 7 the issue of validity must be determined under that domestic law. 8 If, however, the domestic law does not set forth requirements for validity, the Convention will not be displaced, and its General
Provisions9 will be applied to interpret the parties' agreement.' 0
Disclaimers of implied warranties in contracts for the sale of goods
present the issue whether a domestic law establishes requirements for

validity within the meaning of the Convention." Under article 35(2) of
the Convention, goods are not conforming unless they "are fit for the
purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be
used"' 2 and "are fit for any particular purpose. . . known to the seller
at the time of the conclusion of the contract.'1 3 These warranties are
implied in every contract to which the Convention applies unless the parties have "agreed otherwise."14 The Convention thus permits a seller to
ABA Report, supra note 1, at 42, and matters concerning liability of the seller for death or
personal injury caused by the goods to any person, CISG, supra note I, art. 5, at 3,
reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 673; J. Honnold, supra note 1, §§ 71-73, at 100-04; ABA Report,
supra note 1, at 42; Reinhart, supra note 1, at 96; Rosett, supra note 2, at 280; Winship I,
supra note 1, § 1.02[6], at 1-36.
7. CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a), at 2, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980).
8. Honnold, The New Uniform Lawfor InternationalSales and the UCC: A Comparison, 18 Int'l Law. 21, 23-24 (1984). The particular domestic law that will decide issues
of validity is determined by the conflict of laws rules of private international law. See
Samson, supra note 6, at 929. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
9. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 7-13, at 3-4, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 673-74 (1980).
The General Provisions address problems of interpretation of the Convention and the
contracts it governs. See J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 38, at 76. See infra note 10 and
accompanying text.
10. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 7-13, at 3-4, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673-74
(1980). The intentions of the parties are to be used to interpret their agreement. Interpretations of a party's statements and conduct are to be made first "according to his
intent where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what that intent
was." Id. art. 8(1), at 3, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 673; J. Honnold, supra note 1, §§ 10607, at 137-38. When that provision is not applicable, the objective understanding of a
reasonable person of the same kind as the other party under the same circumstances is to
be used to interpret the agreement. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2), at 3, reprinted in 19
I.L.M. at 673; J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 107, at 138. In this situation, consideration
must be given to all of the relevant circumstances of the contract, including negotiations,
subsequent conduct, and usages established between the parties. See CISG, supra note 1,
art. 8(3), at 3, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 673; J. Honnold, supra note 1, §§ 109-11, at 14143. Any such usages are to be further interpreted according to the provisions of article 9.
See CISG, supra note 1, art. 9, at 4, reprintedin 19 J.L.M. at 674; J. Honnold, supra note
1, §§ 112-22, at 144-49.
11. See J. Honnold, supra note 1, §§ 230-34, at 256-59; Honnold, supra note 8, at 2324.
12. CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(2)(a), at 11, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 679 (1980).
13. Id. art. 35(2)(b), at 11, reprinted in 19 J.L.M. at 679.
14. Id. art. 35(2), at 11, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 679; see Schlechtriem, The Seller's
Obligations Under the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale
of Goods, in International Sales: The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods §6.03[1], at 6-20 (1984).
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disclaim all implied warranties.15 Nowhere, however, does it set out re-

quirements for how such a disclaimer is to be made. 1 6 The inference to
be drawn is that the parties are free to make their agreement in whatever

manner they wish.17 This freedom conflicts with section 2-316 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code), 8 which lists specific methods for effectively disclaiming the Code's implied warranties.' 9 These
warranties are in substance the same as those implied by the Conven-

tion." The question raised by this conflict is whether the UCC's disclaimer provisions are requirements for "validity" within the meaning of
the Convention." If the UCC's requirements are not within the Convention's concept of validity, the Convention applies to the disclaimer provision, and a seller may effectively disclaim an implied warranty by the use

of general language22 that may not conform to section 2-316. If the UCC

15. Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Prepared by the Secretariat para. 4, at 92, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Commentary by Secretariat], reprinted in Official Records, supra
note 1, para. 4, at 32. The parties can agree that the quality of the goods will meet higher
standards than those set out in the Convention or that the seller makes no warranties that
the goods conform to any of the Convention's stated norms. Id., reprinted in Official
Records, supra note 1, para. 4, at 32; see Feltham, The United Nations Convention on
Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 1981 J. Bus. L. 346, 353-54; Schlechtriem,
supra note 14, § 6.03[1], at 6-20.
16. See Cain, The Vienna Convention: Posing a New International Law of Sales, 57
Conn. B.J. 327, 334 (1983).
17. Freedom of contract is a dominant theme of the Convention. J. Honnold, supra
note 1, § 2, at 47-48; see ABA Report, supra note 1, at 39; see also J. Honnold, supra note
1, § 25, at 63-64, § 222, at 249 (whether goods are conforming depends on contract of the
parties). The will of the parties is paramount in any agreement between them. This is
evident in certain provisions of the Convention. See, eg., CISG, supra note 1, art. 31, at
10 (Convention's place of delivery provisions may be varied by agreement), reprinted in
19 I.L.M. 668, 678 (1980); id. art. 35(2), at 11 (parties may agree otherwise as to conformity of the goods), reprinted in 19 LL.M. at 679. Article 6 of the Convention is the
most explicit of these provisions, stating that "[tihe parties may exclude the application of
this Convention or ... derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions." Id. art.
6, at 3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 673. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
18. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3) (1977).
19. Id. See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
20. See Cain, supra note 16, at 334. Compare CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(2), at 11,
reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 679 (1980) with U.C.C. §§ 2-314(2), (3), 2-315 (1977). But see
J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 233, at 258 (article 35(2)(a) is somewhat different from
U.C.C. § 2-314). See infra notes 72-78, 139-44 and accompanying text.
21. See J. Honnold, supra note 1, §§ 232, 234, at 257-59. See infra notes 109-19 and
accompanying text.
22. "General language" is language such as that given in U.C.C. § 2-316(2) as sufficient to disclaim an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. U.C.C. § 2-316
official comment 4 (1977). It may be language stating that "It]here are no warranties
which extend beyond the description on the face hereof," U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977), or
merely language stating that there are no warranties, express or implied. See Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1968) (limited
express warranty was "in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied"), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 921 (1969); Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1, 10
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (court stated that implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
could have been disclaimed by general language, after finding that this seller's invoice had
no wording to that effect); O'Neil v. International Harvester Co., 40 Colo. App. 369,
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does dictate requirements of validity, however, the Convention will not
apply to the attempted disclaimer, and a seller who has disclaimed a warranty by using general2 3language may find himself liable for delivering
nonconforming goods.
Professor John Honnold2 4 has argued that consulting section 2-316
when interpreting contracts governed by the Convention is improper. 2 5
He asserts that section 2-316's "requirements" are mere guidelines for
interpreting the parties' agreement rather than imperatives for valid dis-

claimers.2 6 Furthermore, even if section 2-316's requirements must be

met to create a valid disclaimer under the UCC, this type of validity does
not fall within the Convention's concept of that term: 27 "[T]he Convention may not be read so broadly as to import domestic rules that would
supplant other articles of the Convention." 2 8 This Note, however, argues
that the UCC's provisions on disclaimers of warranties are in fact requirements for "validity" within the meaning of the Convention, The
372, 575 P.2d 862, 865 (1978) (court held language "as is without warranty of any character" to be sufficient under U.C.C § 2-316(2)); Cox Motor Car Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d
429, 430-31 (Ky. 1966) (written warranty stated to be "expressly in lieu of all other warranties, expressed or implied" was effective); Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207
Va. 972, 974 n.1, 976-78, 154 S.E.2d 140, 142 n.1, 144 (1967) (disclaimer stating "[t]here
are no warranties, expressed or implied," other than those given by dealer, and "warranty
is expressly in lieu of all other warranties," was held effective); G. Wallach, The Law of
Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code 11. 1l[][b], at 11-51 (1981) (general statement that there are no warranties suffices to disclaim implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose); J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 12-5, at 439 (2d ed. 1980) (general language excludes implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). But see Boeing Airplane Co. v. O'Malley, 329
F.2d 585, 593 (8th Cir. 1964) (disclaimer of implied warranty must be in clear and specific language, so as to leave no doubt as to intent of parties); Imperial Stamp & Engraving Co. v. Bailey, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 835, 836-38, 403 N.E.2d 294, 296-97 (1980) (the phrase
"overall production is not guaranteed" could not be reasonably interpreted to mean there
were no warranties).
23. The seller's basic contractual obligation is to provide goods that conform to the
agreement. Schlechtriem, supra note 14, § 6.03[1], at 6-19. When nonconforming goods
are delivered, the UCC indicates that liability of the seller will depend on whether he has
effectively disclaimed in the contract any implied warranties as to the goods. See U.C.C.
§§ 2-314 to -316 (1977); G. Wallach, supra note 22, 1 11.11, at 11-49 ;J. White & R.
Summers, supra note 22, § 12-1, at 427. The seller may effectively disclaim the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose through general language. See U.C.C. § 2316(2) (1977). If the seller seeks to disclaim the warranty of merchantability, however,
the Code explicitly states that general language is not permitted. See id. The disclaimer
is not effective to protect a seller from liability if the goods he delivers do not conform to
the contract.
24. Professor Honnold served as co-chairman of the United States delegation to tile
97th Diplomatic Conference, which promulgated the Convention. Senate Hearing,supra
note 2, at 20 (statement of John Honnold, Schnader Professor of Commercial Law, Univ.
of Pa.). He also represented the United States at the 1964 Hague Conference, and was
the Secretary of UNCITRAL from 1969 to 1974. See id. at 18.
25. See J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 233, at 258.
26. See id. § 234, at 258-59.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 259.
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UCC language is mandatory.2 9 If a disclaimer clause does not meet section 2-316's prescriptions, that clause cannot be valid.3" The Convention
will not give effect to a contract provision if the substantive domestic law
that would otherwise govern the contract would not do so. 3
Part I of this Note discusses the scope of the Convention and the

meaning of validity. Part II considers whether section 2-316 sets forth
requirements for validity within the Convention's concept of that term,

and concludes that it does. Part III examines the interaction of the Convention and the UCC after a disclaimer of implied warranties is found
invalid under section 2-316.
I. THE SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION AND THE MEANING OF
VALIDITY

Whether UCC section 2-316's disclaimer provisions set forth requirements for validity within the meaning of the Convention32 is determined
by examining the concept of validity in the context of the Convention's
overall scope. The Convention applies to contracts for the sale of goods
33
between parties whose places of business are in different countries if
those countries are "Contracting States"---countries that have ratified
the Convention 3 4 -or if the rules of private international law" would
lead to the application of the law of a Contracting State. 36 The Conven29. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
31. Report of the Working Group on the International Sale of Goods on the Work of
its Sixth Session to UNCITRAL para. 32, at 8, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/100 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Report, Working Group, Sixth Session], reprinted in [1975] 6 Y.B. UNCITRAL para. 32, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A/1975 [hereinafter cited as Yearbook
6]. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
33. CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1), at 1, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 672 (1980); see ABA
Report, supra note 1, at 39, 42; Farnsworth II, supra note 1, at 19; R~czei, The Area of
Operation of the InternationalSales Conventions, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 513, 517 (1981);
Reinhart, supra note 1, at 95; Rosett, supra note 2, at 277; Winship I, supra note 1,
§ 1.02[4], at 1-26 to -29; Practitioner'sGuide, supra note 1, at 87. That the parties have
places of business in different countries is to be disregarded if that fact has not appeared
under any of the circumstances before concluding the contract. CISG, supra note 1, art.
1(2), at 1, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 672; Rosett, supra note 2, at 278. The nationality of
the parties and the civil or commercial character of the parties or the contract are irrelevant in determining whether the Convention applies. CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(3), at 2,
reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 672.
34. CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(a), at 1, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 672 (1980); J.
Honnold, supra note 1, § 45, at 81. See supra note 2.
35. The terms "private international law" and "conflict of laws" are synonymous.
See H. Goodrich & E. Scoles, Handbook of the Conflict of Laws 5-6 (4th ed. 1964); P.
North, Cheshire and North Private International Law 12-13 (10th ed. 1979); M. Wolff,
Private International Law 10 (2d ed. 1950).
36. CISG, supra note 1, art. l(l)(b), at 1, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 672 (1980); J.
Honnold, supra note 1, § 46, at 82; Winship I, supra note 1, § 1.02[41[b], at 1-30 to -31.
Article 95 of the Convention permits a Contracting State to make a declaration at the
time of "ratification, acceptance, approval or accession that it will not be bound by subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1." CISG, supra note 1, art. 95, at 30, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at
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tion governs formation of the contract and the corresponding rights and
obligations of the seller and buyer. 7 This broad scope is limited in several ways. Article 6 expressly permits the parties to exclude application
of the Convention and to derogate from or vary the effect of any of its
provisions.3 8 The Convention also excludes certain types of transactions,
most notably consumer sales, 39 and certain 40issues, such as "the validity
of the contract or of any of its provisions."
4
The term validity, however, is never defined in the Convention. 1
693; see J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 47, at 82-84; R~czei, supra note 33, at 521; Winship
I, supra note 1, § 1.02[4][c], at 1-31 to -32. The Senate is likely to make such a reservation if it ratifies the Convention. See supra note 2.
37. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 4, at 2, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980); J.
Honnold, supra note 1, §§ 62-63, at 94-95; ABA Report, supra note 1, at 39; Practitioner's
Guide, supra note 1, at 88.
38. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6, at 3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980); ABA
Report, supra note 1, at 42; Rosett, supra note 2, at 280; Practitioner'sGuide, supra note
1, at 87; see J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 74, at 105; Kahn, La Convention de Vienne du 11
Avril 1980 sur les contrats de vente internationalede marchandises, 33 Revue Internationale de Droit Compar6 [R.I.D.C.] 951, 961 (1980); Reinhart, supra note 1, at 96; Winship
I, supra note 1, § 1.02[5], at 1-32 to -33; see also Feltham, supra note 15, at 348 (Convention applies unless the parties exclude its application); Rosett, supra note 2, at 265 (Convention permits the contracting parties to exclude by agreement the application of its
provisions). It is unclear whether this exclusion by the parties must be express or
whether it may be implied. Id. at 280-81; Winship I, supra note 1, § 1.025], at 1-34 to
-35. In light of the Convention's detailed rules for determining the intentions of the parties, an express declaration should not be required. Winship I, supra note 1, § 1.02[5], at
1-35; see CISG, supra note 1, arts. 8-9, at 3-4, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 673-74. But see
Dore & DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL
Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23
Harv. Int'l L.J. 49, 53-54 (1982) (allowing a finding of implied exclusions may lead to
results contrary to parties' intent).
39. The Convention specifically excludes from its scope any sales "of goods bought
for personal, family or household use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither knew nor ought to have known that the goods were
bought for any such use." CISG, supra note 1, art. 2(a), at 2, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668,
672 (1980); see J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 50, at 85-87; ABA Report, supra note 1, at 39,
42; Farnsworth II, supra note 1, at 19; Reinhart, supra note 1, at 96; Practitioner'sGuide,
supra note 1, at 88.
It is conceivable that a sale governed by the Convention may fall within the provisions
of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2301 (1982) (the Act), which deals with consumer product warranties. A "consumer product" is defined as "any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes." Id.
§ 2301(1). Arguably, a "sale of a consumer product" is not a "sale to a consumer" within
the meaning of Convention article 2(a). This presents a potential conflict between the
Convention and the Act because by its terms the Act may apply to exports to foreign
jurisdictions. "However, the public interest would not be served by the use of Commission resources to enforce the Act with respect to such products. . . . The Commission
does not contemplate the enforcement of the Act with respect to consumer products exported to foreign jurisdictions." Interpretations of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 16
C.F.R. § 700.1(i) (1984).
40. CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a), at 2, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980). See
supra note 6 and accompanying text.
41. Samson, supra note 6, at 929 ("La Convention ne d6finit pas le terme 'validit6'
.

'..
)
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Before an issue can be excluded from the Convention as a question of
42
validity the meaning of that term must be determined. When a treaty's

drafters do not directly enact definitions of statutory terms, they may do

so indirectly by means of interpretational directives.4 3 These are rules

that, without reference to particular words, "speciffy] how provisions
. . . are to be construed and applied, or what effects are to be given

them."'

The Convention contains such interpretational directives in its

General Provisions.4 5 Article 7 in particular sets out instructions for interpreting the Convention and settling questions governed by it.

Article 7(2) states that matters governed by the Convention but not
expressly settled by it are to be examined under "the general principles

on which [the Convention] is based." 46 Application of such principles
may prove to be impossible, however, because the drafters themselves

were unable to identify them.47 When application of general principles is
42. The ordinary rules of statutory construction are relevant to the interpretation of
international agreements. IA C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 32.09, at 381 (4th ed. 1972). Thus, they are applicable to the Convention. However,
this application is conditioned on the special circumstances of such agreements. Id.
These special circumstances include the "wider spectrum" of affected parties and interests, and the corresponding lower "homogeneity of pertinent attitudes than is usually the
case with respect to domestic legislation." Id. at 382. They also include the "greater
degree of professionalism" and care taken in formulating ideas and drafting agreements,
and the "subjection of agreements to the possibility of interpretation by a wider assortment of tribunals and authorities." Id. The first step in construing a treaty, as with any
piece of legislation, is an examination of the textual language, composition and structure.
2A N. Singer, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.01 (C. Sands rev.
4th ed. 1984). Other steps are a study of the legislative history and considerations of
public policy. Id., §§ 48.01, .03, 56.01-.02. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
43. IA C. Sands, supra note 42, § 27.01, at 308-09.
44. Id. at 308.
45. See 2A N. Singer, supra note 42, § 47.02. See supra note 9. Article 7 is the most
relevant of the General Provisions, because it states the manner in which the Convention
is to be construed and the principles underlying this method of construction:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and
the observance of good faith in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles
on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
CISG, supra note 1, art. 7, at 3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980).
46. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2), at 3, reprintedin 19 LL.M. 668, 673 (1980).
47. The Convention's legislative history shows that the necessity and meaning of a
provision on "general principles" were hotly debated issues. See Summary Records,
First Committee, Fifth Meeting, supra note I (discussions as to desirability and wording
of what would become article 7), in Official Records, supra note 1, paras. 6, 8, 12-14, 17,
20-21, 23-24, 26, 28, 31, 34-35, 39, 41, 43, 53, 59, at 255-59; Report, First Committee,
Sixth Plenary Meeting, supra note I (discussion of proposed amendments to article 6, the
immediate precursor of article 7), in Official Records, supra note 1, paras. 37-44, at 202;
Report, First Committee, supra note 1, at 13-14 (proposal adopted as to article 6 for
consideration at the 1980 Conference), reprintedin Official Records, supra note 1, paras.
2-3, at 87; Tenth Session Report, supra note 1, paras. 139-40, at 65, paras. 145-47, at 6667 (proposed amendment to draft article 13, another ancestor of Convention article 7),
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not possible,4" questions not expressly settled in the Convention are to be
settled "in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of
private international law." 4 9 Thus, the language of the Convention
points to domestic law as the source for a definition of validity.5 0 It is

clear from article 4(a) that because the Convention excludes all matters
of validity, domestic law will govern such matters. 5 Article 7(2) makes

it apparent that domestic law not only governs validity, but indeed must
define it as well.

Article 7(1) also sets forth interpretational directives. In construing

the Convention, "regard is to be had to its international character."5' 2
Professor Honnold's arguments indicate that he believes that preservation of that character requires a narrow view of what constitutes a matter
reprintedin Yearbook 8, supra note I, paras. 139-40, 145-47, at 34-35; Analysis of Comments, Articles 1-17, supra note 1, paras. 52-56, at 18-20 (discussion of ULIS article 17,
first forerunner of Convention article 7), reprintedin Yearbook 3, supra note 1, paras. 5260, at 76-77; Report, Working Group, First Session, supra note 1, paras. 57-60, at 14-15,
paras. 63-64, 66, 68, 70, at 16-17 (same), reprintedin Yearbook 1,supra note 1, paras. 5760, 63-64, 66, 68, 70, at 182-83; Analysis of Studies, supra note 1, paras. 95-97, at 33
(same), reprinted in Yearbook 1, supra note 1, paras. 95-97, at 170. Professor Honnold
has given several examples of these "general principles." See J. Honnold, supra note 1,
§§ 99-101, at 129-32. Such examples include the protection of reliance on the representations of the other party, a duty of the parties to communicate, and a duty to mitigate
damages. Honnold's method of finding general principles would require a tribunal to
decide whether the drafters of the Convention deliberately rejected a specific provision
relevant to the disputed issue or whether they failed to anticipate the problem. Id. § 102,
at 132. If the tribunal decides that the answer is a lack of foresight, it must decide
whether the issue at hand is so closely analogous to other specific provisions in the Convention that application of the same provisions is justified. Id. at 133.
48. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2), at 3, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980).
49. Id., reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 673.
50. See Kahn, supra note 38, at 962. When a matter is not governed by the Convention, "recourse to domestic law is necessary, because a development of the Uniform Sales
Law into fields not governed by the Convention would be an infringement of the lawmaking powers and bodies of the countries whose domestic law should be applied instead
of the Uniform Law." Schlechtriem, From the Hague to Vienna-Progressin Unification
of the Law of InternationalSales Contracts?, in The Transnational Law of International
Commercial Transactions 133 (1982).
51. By requiring reference to domestic law, the Convention conforms to the traditional rule of private international law that the validity of a contract is determined by the
"proper law." A. Dicey & J. Morris, Dicey and Morris On The Conflict of Laws 739 (J.
Morris 10th ed. 1980); J. Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict of Laws § 4, at 381 (2d ed.
1954); R. Graveson, The Conflict of Laws 345 (5th ed. 1965); P. North, supra note 35, at
223. Under the rules of private international law, a court can look to its own law to
determine the validity of a contract if the court decides that enforcement of the contract
under the proper law would contravene the public policies of the forum. See A. Dicey &
J. Morris, supra, at 801-02; J. Falconbridge, supra, § 6, at 387; A. Kuhn, Comparative
Commentaries on Private International Law or Conflict of Laws 37 (1937); P. North,
supra note 35, at 224. Thus, the analogy: The Convention requires reference to the domestic law that would otherwise be applicable under the rules of private international law
to determine the validity of the contract; the rules of private international law permit
reference to the public policies of the forum to determine the validity of the contract. See
infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
52. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1), at 3, reprinted in 19 J.L.M. 668, 673 (1980).
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of validity.53 He asserts that article 4(a)'s reference to validity "may not
be read so broadly as to import domestic rules that would supplant other
articles of the Convention." 4 This argument, however, is not supported
by the Convention's legislative history, which demonstrates that the Convention's international character requires deference to mandatory national laws founded on public policy principles." Many governments
feared that an international sale of goods law would supplant such
laws.56 To assuage such fears, the drafters excluded from the Convention's scope all matters concerning "the validity of the contract or of any
of its provisions." 5 The drafters recognized that certain forms of
mandatory national laws exist solely for public benefit-to prevent the
occurrence of any event those legislatures deem to be improper.5 8 Under
53. See J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 234, at 259.
54. Id.
55. One of the earliest working group discussions centered on what issues were explicitly excluded from the 1964 Uniform Laws. Article 5(2) of the ULIS preserved "any
mandatory provision of national law for the protection of a party to a contract which
contemplates the purchase of goods by that party by payment of the price by instalments." ULIS, supra note 1, art. 5(2), 834 U.N.T.S. 107, 125, reprintedin 3 I.L.M. 855,
857 (1964). Article 8, the forerunner of Convention article 4(a), stated that the Uniform
Law was not concerned "with the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of
any usage." Id. art. 8, 834 U.N.T.S. 107, 125, reprintedin 3 I.L.M. at 857. The perceived
problem was whether the specific reference to the preservation of national laws relating to
installment sales implied that all other mandatory rules were superseded by the ULIS, or
whether they too were preserved under article 8. See Third Session Report, supra note 1,
paras. 60-63, at 16-17, reprintedin Yearbook 1, supra note 1, paras. 60.63, at 136-37. The
predominant belief was that regulatory laws would be preserved by article 8, although
any such laws which were not confined to the validity of the contract would not be protected. Id. para. 61, at 17, reprintedin Yearbook 1,supra note 1, para. 61, at 136-37. See
infra note 56 and accompanying text.
56. Early comments on the ULIS by various countries indicated that governments
felt very strongly about their mandatory national rules. Norway, for example, wanted
article 5(2) of the ULIS deleted or amended to extend it to all mandatory rules relating to
public policy. Analysis of Studies, supra note 1, para. 72, at 28, reprintedin Yearbook 1,
supra note 1, para. 72, at 168. It argued that whether a national mandatory rule should
be regarded as an imperative for an international transaction should be governed by national law. Id., reprintedin Yearbook 1, supra note 1, para. 72, at 168. The government
of Hungary also thought that rules of public policy should prevail over the Uniform Law.
Id. para. 74, at 28, reprinted in Yearbook 1, supra note I, para. 74, at 168.
57. CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a), at 2, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980).
58. See Honnold, supra note 8, at 23-24. Mandatory national laws of public policy
relating to the validity of a contract were left solely to the relevant domestic law. See
Senate Hearing,supra note 2, at 26 (statement of Mark R. Joelson, Chairman, Section of
Int'l Law and Practice, Am. Bar Ass'n); see also Na6n, The UN Convention on Contracts
for the InternationalSale of Goods, in The Transnational Law on International Commercial Transactions 101 (1982) ("validity of usages will depend on the mandatory provisions
of the internal law indicated by national conflicts rules"). It was clear that matters such
as capacity to make a contract, see J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 66, at 97, error, mistake,
fraud, duress and illegality were also excluded from the Convention through article 4(a).
Winship I, supra note 1, § 1.02[6], at 1-37; see Reinhart, supra note 1, at 96. The Convention does not overrule domestic laws relating to the validity of a contract. See Tenth
Session Report, supra note 1, paras. 74, 76, at 54-55, reprintedin Yearbook 8, supra note
1, paras. 74, 76, at 30. It does not confer validity on a contractual provision if that
provision would not be valid under the applicable domestic law. See Commentary,
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the Convention, a contractual provision is invalid if enforcing it will pro-

duce an effect proscribed by national law.5 9 This definition of validity
comports with that recognized by the traditional rules of private international law. Generally, the validity of the contract is determined under

the proper law-the law of the country with the most substantial connection to the contract." However, this is subject to a well-known exception: The court need not apply the proper law to a contract if it finds
that such application will contravene an important public policy of the
forum. 6 A court may find a contract invalid, and thus refuse to enforce

it, for reasons of justice and morality,62 as well as for less emotional pub-

lic policy reasons such as negligence and risk of loss,63 and formal requirements for validity.'
Article 7(1) also states that uniformity of application is to be considWorking Group Seventh Session, supra note 1, para. 3, at 12 (article 7 of the 1976 draft
became article 4 of the 1980 Convention), reprinted in Yearbook 7, supra note 1, para. 3,
at 100; Report, Working Group Sixth Session, supra note 31, para. 32, at 8 (article 8
became article 7, later article 4), reprintedin Yearbook 6, supra note 31, para. 32, at 52.
59. Schlechtriem, supra note 14, § 6.01, at 6-3.
60. See A. Dicey & J. Morris, supra note 51, at 739; J. Falconbridge, supra note 51,
§ 4, at 381; R. Graveson, supra note 51, at 345; P. North, supra note 35, at 223.
61. See A. Dicey & J. Morris, supra note 51, at 801-02; A. Kuhn, supra note 51, at 37;
P. North, supra note 35, at 146; A. Scott, Private International Law 220 (2d ed. 1979).
62. See Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 277-78 (1880) (contract for commissions by corrupt Turkish official); Roth v. Patino, 185 Misc. 235, 236-37, 56 N.Y.S.2d
853, 854-55 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (contract putting a wife at "beck and call" of another man
valid in France, held to be "inconsistent with, and destructive of, [wife's] marriage" and
in direct contravention with the policies of New York), affid mem., 270 A.D. 927, 62
N.Y.S.2d 820 (1946), rev'd mem. on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 543, 80 N.E.2d 673 (1948);
see also Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 159 Misc. 830, 837-44, 290 N.Y.S.
181, 189-96 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (defense that the laws of Germany at that time mandatcd a
breach of company's employment contract with Jewish plaintiff held to be invalid because
recognition of defense would outrage the conscience of the court); cf.Grosman v. Union
Transit Co., 228 F. 610, 612, 615-16 (5th Cir. 1916) (protection of married woman's
property on a surety contract; conflict between laws of Texas and Illinois), afid, 245 U.S.
412 (1918); International Hotel Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 13-14, 203 N.E.2d 210,
211-13, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529-31 (1964) (contract for payment of gambling losses; conflict between laws of New York and Puerto Rico).
63. See The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 268-70 (1902) (negligence resulting in property loss); Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F.2d 724, 727, 731-33 (2d Cir. 1925)
(negligence resulting in personal injury); Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y.
407, 410-11, 414-15, 173 N.E. 564, 565-67 (1930) (negligence resulting in theft); cf.Fox v.
Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 138 Wis. 648, 649, 651-53, 120 N.W. 399, 399-401 (1909) (clause
seeking to relieve telegraph company of liability for negligence valid under New York
law, held void and therefore unenforceable under Wisconsin law).
64. See Roth v. Patino, 185 Misc. 235, 237, 56 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (Sup. Ct. 1945)
(oral agreement made in France not to be completed before the end of a lifetime, and
violated Statute of Frauds), affd mem., 270 A.D. 927, 62 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1946), rev'd
mem. on other grounds, 298 N.Y. 543, 80 N.E.2d 673 (1948); Royal Exch. Assurance
Corp. v. Sjorforsakrings Aktiebolaget Vega, [1901] 2 K.B. 567, 573-75, aff'd, [1902] 2
K.B. 384 (C.A.) (lack of formal stamp rendered insurance policy invalid under English
law, even if valid under Swedish law); Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801-03, 824, 826-27, 138
Eng. Rep. 1119, 1120-21, 1129-30 (C.P. 1852) (oral employment contract valid in France
held unenforceable in England for violation of Statute of Frauds).
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ered when construing the Convention.65 It may be argued that such application could be hindered by a broad view of validity. A contractual

provision could be valid under one domestic law, yet invalid under another. This argument fails to recognize, however, that article 7(1) dis-

cusses uniform application, not uniform results.66 Although a broad

view of validity-one which recognizes national mandatory laws-may

lead to different results in different contracts, 67 it would not prevent uniform application of the Convention if employed consistently.
The drafters' respect for national laws is apparent from other parts of

the Convention's legislative history. Although article 6 grants the parties

freedom to alter the Convention by agreement, 6 the drafters never intended such freedom to allow the parties to circumvent national
mandatory laws by agreeing to exclude article 4(a). 69 In all cases, the

national law indicated by the rules of private international law will govern the validity of the contract. 70 Thus, the drafters intended validity

under article 4(a) to include matters of public policy as defined by the
laws of individual Contracting States. It is necessary, therefore, to con-

sider whether section 2-316's exclusion of warranty provisions are within
that concept of validity.7 '
65. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1), at 3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980).
66. "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had. . . to the need to
promote uniformity in its application. . . ." Id., reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 673. This
provision calls for uniform application of the Convention, but not necessarily for uniform
results. See Barbi6, Uniform Law on the InternationalSale of Goods, Uniform Law on the
Formation of Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods (1964) and United Nations
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods (1980), in Hague-Zagreb Essays 4 on the Law of International Trade 9 (1983).
67. For example, the law of the country in which Seller X has his place of business
forbids for reasons of public policy the making of a contract on a Sunday, whereas the
law of the country in which Seller Y does business has no such interdiction. Buyer Z
makes a contract of sale on a Sunday with both of them. A uniform application of article
4(a) of the Convention would cause the exclusion from the Convention's scope of the
contract that contravenes a domestic public policy (X-Z contract), and the inclusion of
the contract that does not (Y-Z contract). Article 4(a) would have been applied to both
contracts in the same way, yet the results would differ. The need for a broad view of
validity becomes apparent when the wide range of domestic rules relating to validity of a
contract is considered. Samson, supra note 6, at 929 ("L'impossibilit6 d'obtenir un consensus au niveau international sur un ensemble de rfgles concernant la validit6 du contrat, rend cependant in6vitable l'exclusion du champ d'application de la Convention de
toute question concernant la validit6 du contrat.").
68. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 6, at 3, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980).
69. See Winship I, supra note 1, § 1.02[5], at 1-34. The Convention's exclusion of
issues of validity was intended to preserve what domestic law characterizes as matters of
public policy. Therefore the parties should not be permitted to agree to exclude article
4(a) from their contract. To do so would violate that same public policy. Cf. Analysis of
Comments, Working Group, supra note 1, art. 4, para. 1, at 10 (countries feared that
parties to a contract would mistakenly believe they could agree to exclude any mandatory
provisions of national law), reprinted in Yearbook 8, supra note 1, art. 4, para. 1,at 146;
J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 84, at 112 (mandatory rules of domestic law are not disturbed when parties agree to apply the Convention).
70. See supra notes 40-41, 48-50 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
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DISCLAIMERS OF IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER THE UCC

Under the UCC, there are two types of implied warranties relating to
the quality of the goods:

merchantability. 73

fitness for a particular purpose 72 and

The warranty of merchantability arises by operation

of law74 in a sale of goods transaction 7 5 in which the seller is a merchant

with respect to the goods sold.76 The seller warrants that the goods "are
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 77 The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose arises by operation of law when
the seller has reason to know that the buyer has a particular purpose in
purchasing goods and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or
judgment in selecting goods suitable for that purpose. 7 The seller can
disclaim either or both warranties by following the methods provided in
section 2-316." An examination of that section's language, 0 legislative
history8 ' and public policy purposes8 2 demonstrates that its provisions
for validity within the Convention's concept of
set forth requirements
8 3
that term.

A.

The Language of Section 2-316

Section 2-316(2) states that "to exclude

.

.

the implied warranty of

72. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (1977).
73. See id. § 2-314. Section 2-312 implies a warranty of title in contracts for the sales
of goods. See id. § 2-312. The issue whether § 2-312 sets forth requirements of validity is
beyond the scope of this Note.
74. 3 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-314:25, at 133 (3d ed. 1983). Unless effectively disclaimed, the warranty is implied in every sale of goods by a merchant
with respect to those goods, even if the seller has in fact made no warranties. The seller's
intention is irrelevant. See Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77,
83 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973); T. Quinn, Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest
2-314[A][2], at S2-124 (Supp. 1984).
75. A sale of goods transaction under the Code is a transaction that consists of the
"passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price," U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1977), and of
anything which is "moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other
than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities. . . and things in
action," id. § 2-105(1).
76. "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill.
Id. § 2-104(1).
77. Id. § 2-314(2)(c).
78. Id. § 2-315; see Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495,
501, 190 N.W.2d 275, 279 (1971); 3 R. Anderson, supra note 74, § 2-315:29, at 302; T.
Quinn, supra note 74, 2-315[A][2], at 2-161; G. Wallach, supra note 22, 11.09, at 1143; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 22, § 9-9, at 358.
79. See infra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
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merchantability ... the language must mention merchantability and in
case of a writing must be conspicuous." 8' 4 The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose may be disclaimed by general language,85

but such a disclaimer "must be by a writing and conspicuous." 86 Such

repeated use of the auxiliary verb "must" 8 is a primary indication of
section 2-316(2)'s mandatory character.8 8 "The effect of holding a statute mandatory is to require strict compliance with its letter in order...
to enable persons to acquire rights under it." 9 Section 2-316(2)'s
mandatory nature indicates that its requirements are those of validity.
These requirements are, however, "subject to"9 0 section 2-316(3)."' A
seller who has failed to comply with section 2-316(2) may still have made
a valid disclaimer under section 2-316(3).92 Whereas section 2-316(2)'s
requirements are quite specific,93 section 2-316(3) allows for generali-

84. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977); see Walker Ford Sales v. Gaither, 265 Ark. 275, 27778, 578 S.W.2d 23, 24 (1979); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Secord Bros., 73 Misc. 2d 1031,
1034-35, 343 N.Y.S.2d 256, 260-61 (Sup. Ct. 1973), a.f'd mem., 44 A.D.2d 906, 357
N.Y.S.2d 702 (1974); Bakal v. Burroughs Corp., 74 Misc. 2d 202, 204-05, 343 N.Y.S.2d
541, 543-44 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d
495, 498-99, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818, 822-23 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Angola Farm Supply & Equip.
Co. v. FMC Corp., 59 N.C. App. 272, 277, 296 S.E.2d 503, 506-07 (1982).
85. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
86. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977); see Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514,
1533 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Hi Neighbor Enters. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823, 826
(N.D. Fla. 1980); Quality Acceptance Corp. v. Million & Albers, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 771,
773 (D. Wyo. 1973); Rite Fabrics, Inc. v. Stafford-Higgins Co., 366 F. Supp. 1, 10
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
87. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 1616 (2d ed.
1936).
88. 2A N. Singer, supra note 42, § 57.03; see Huff v. Bruce, 261 Ark. 498, 502, 549
S.W.2d 282, 283-84 (1977); Hopkins v. Maryland Inmate Grievance Comm'n, 40 Md.
App. 329, 334, 391 A.2d 1213, 1216 (1978); Burnell v. Smith, 122 Misc. 2d 342, 345, 471
N.Y.S.2d 493, 496 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Black's Law Dictionary 919 (5th ed. 1979); cf. Williams v. Kaestner, 332 S.W.2d 21, 27 (Mo. 1960) ("should" means "to be obliged" or
"must"); 487 Clinton Ave. Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 63 Misc. 2d 715, 717-18, 313
N.Y.S.2d 445, 447-48 (Sup. Ct. 1970) ("shall" means "must" and is generally
mandatory).
89. 2A N. Singer, supra note 42, § 57.12 at 667.
90. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977).
91. Id. § 2-316(3).
92. Id.; see Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1066
(6th Cir. 1977); Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1394, 1396-97
(6th Cir. 1970); Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514, 1533 (E.D. Mich.
1984); 3 R. Anderson, supra note 74, §§ 2-316:26, :28, at 343; J. White & IL Summers,
supra note 22, § 12-6, at 447; Lord, Some Thoughts About Warranty Lan" Express and
Implied Warranties, 56 N.D.L. Rev. 509, 680 (1980); Special Project. Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 30, 191-92 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Article Two Warranties].
93. See 2 W. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series § 2-316:03, at 381-82
(1984). Section 2-316(2) requires that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability mention merchantability, and, if in writing, be conspicuous. It also requires that a disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose be in
writing and conspicuous. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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ties.94 The existence of such generalities may compel the conclusion that
section 2-316 sets forth mere guidelines for interpretation of the parties'

agreement rather than requirements for valid disclaimers. 95 This argument is unpersuasive, however, because a disclaimer that fails to meet the

requirements of either subdivision will be held to be invalid.96 Section 2316(3)(a) enables a seller to exclude an implied warranty by using expres-

sions such as "with all faults," "as is," "or other language which in the
common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of

warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty." 97 This is
not an automatic disclaimer; the circumstances must be such as to give
the buyer reason to know that there is no implied warranty. 9

Section 2-316(3)(b) authorizes disclaimers by examination. For such a
disclaimer to be effective, the buyer must have either examined the goods
before the contract was made or refused to examine them. 9 9 It follows
that the seller must demand that the buyer examine the goods, not

merely make them available for inspection, in order for the buyer's re94. See 2 W. Hawkland, supra note 93, § 2-316:03, at 383. See infra notes 97-106 and
accompanying text.
95. Cf J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 234, at 259 (U.C.C. § 2-316(3) provides a rule of
interpretation because it allows language which in the "common understanding" of the
parties alerts the buyer to the exclusion of warranties and "makes plain" that there is no
implied warranty).
96. See Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649, 654-56 (W.D.
Pa. 1968), modified on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970); Zicari v. Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 22-23, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923-25 (1969);
Discount Drug Corp. v. Honeywell Protection Servs., 303 Pa. Super. 522, 525-26, 450
A.2d 49, 50-51 (1982); SFC Acceptance Corp. v. Ferree, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 225, 228-29
(1966); Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 141 (S.D. 1977);
Cooper Paintings & Coatings, Inc. v. SCM Corp., 62 Tenn. App. 13, 19-20, 457 S.W.2d
864, 867 (1970); Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App.
539, 542, 545-47, 625 P.2d 171, 173-76 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-316 official comment 1 (1977);
3 R. Anderson, supra note 74, § 2-316:35 to :36, at 349, § 2-316:42 to :43, at 353-54, § 2316:66 to :69, at 367-69; T. Quinn, supra note 74, S 2-316[A][9][b], at 2-175 to -176; J.
White & R. Summers, supra note 22, § 12-5, at 437-38; Moye, Exclusion and Modification of Warranty Under the UCC-How to Succeed in Business Without Being Liablefor
Not Really Trying, 46 Den. L.J. 579, 605, 612 (1969).
97. U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(a) (1977).
98. See Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., I ll N.J. Super. 383, 393,
395, 397, 268 A.2d 345, 351-53 (Law Div. 1970), overruled on other grounds, Ramirez v,
Autosport Corp., 88 N.J. 277, 287, 440 A.2d 1345, 1350 (1982); 3 R. Anderson, supra
note 74, § 2-316:72, at 371; T. Quinn, supra note 74, 1 2-316[A][10][a], at 2-176 to -177
(1978); J. White & R. Summers, supra note 22, § 12-6, at 447-49; Lord, supra note 92, at
681; Weintraub, Disclaimerof Warrantiesand Limitation of Damagesfor Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53 Tex. L. Rev. 60, 66 (1975); see also Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp.
v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 297, 306, 216 N.E.2d 282, 286-87 (1965) (disclaimer not effective unless buyer "fully aware that he takes product subject to such conditions"); G. Wallach, supra note 22, 1 11.11 [1][b][i], at 11-54 (can use language such as
"as is," which is commonly understood to exclude warranties).
99. Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025 (D. Conn.
1975); see U.C.C. § 2-316 official comment 8 (1977); 3 R. Anderson, supra note 74, § 2316:88 to :91, at 382-85; T. Quinn, supra note 74, 2-316[A][10][e], at 2-178 to -179
(1978); G. Wallach, supra note 22, 111.1 l[l][d], at 11-57; J. White & R. Summers, supra
note 22, § 12-6, at 450; Lord, supra note 92, at 684-87.
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fusal to examine to constitute a disclaimer.l°°
Under section 2-316(3)(c), a course of dealing, 10 course of perform3
ance 10 2 or trade usage 0 3 can also exclude an implied warranty.0'
That

section cannot be used, however, unless the facts indicate that such a

practice was part of the parties' agreement.10 5

It has been argued that section 2-316(3) does not set forth requirements for validity because it requires interpretation of circumstances. 0 6
For example, "common understanding" under section 2-316(3)(a) seems

to refer to a standard of a reasonable person under the circumstances.
Similarly, section 2-316(3)(c) shows that a course of dealing, course of
performance or usage of the trade can guide the interpretation of the
parties' agreement. Merely because section 2-316 permits an interpreta-

tion of the disclaimer clause, however, does not give rise to an inference
that the entire section is not language of validity.10

Interpretation is

necessary only to determine whether the attempted disclaimer is valid.'0 8
If the circumstances as contemplated in section 2-316(3) do not allow

effect to be given to a disclaimer that has no effect under section 2-316(2),
the disclaimer is invalid.
100. 3 R. Anderson, supra note 74, § 2-316:92, :94, :98, at 384-85, 387; T. Quinn, supra
note 74, 2-316[A][14][a] to [c], at S2-165 to -169 (Supp. 1984); G. Wallach, supra note
22, 11.11[1][d], at 11-57; J. White & R. Summers, supra note 22, § 12-6, at 450-51;
Moye, supra note 96, at 611-12.
101. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1977).
102. Id. § 2-208(1).
103. See id. § 1-205(2).
104. Id. § 2-316(3)(c); see Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551
F.2d 1057, 1066 (6th Cir. 1977); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 26061, 544 P.2d 20, 23-24 (1975); Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28
Wash. App. 539, 547, 625 P.2d 171, 176 (1981); T. Quinn, supra note 74, f 2316[A][1 1], at 2-179 (1978), S2-161 to -162 (Supp. 1984); J. White & R. Summers, supra
note 22, § 12-6, at 454-57; Lord, supra note 92, at 583-84; Weintraub, supra note 98, at
68-69; Article Two Warranties,supra note 92, at 202-06.

105. See Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1394, 1396-97 (6th
Cir. 1970); Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514, 1533 (E.D. Mich. 1984);
Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 22, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923-24 (1969); United
States Leasing Corp. v. Comerald Assocs., 101 Misc. 2d 773, 776, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1003,
1005 (Civ. Ct. 1979); Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 495,
500, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818, 823-24 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble
Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App. 539, 546-47, 625 P.2d 171, 175-76 (1981).
106. See J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 234, at 259.
107. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
108. See, eg., Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057, 1066
(6th Cir. 1977); Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1394, 1396-97
(6th Cir. 1970); Blockhead, Inc. v. Plastic Forming Co., 402 F. Supp. 1017, 1025 (D.
Conn. 1975); Ambassador Steel Co. v. Ewald Steel Co., 33 Mich. App. 495, 502-04, 190
N.W.2d 275, 279-80 (1971); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 111 NJ.
Super. 383, 390-92, 397-99, 268 A.2d 345, 352, 354 (Law Div. 1970), orerruledon other
grounds, Ramirez v. Autosport Corp., 88 N.J. 277, 287, 440 A.2d 1345, 1350 (1982);
Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 22-23, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918, 923-25 (1969);
United States Leasing Corp. v. Comerald Assocs., 101 Misc. 2d 773, 776, 421 N.Y.S.2d
1003, 1005 (Civ. Ct. 1979); Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28
Wash. App. 539, 544-47, 625 P.2d 171, 174-76 (1981).
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Legislative History and Policy Considerations

The official comments to section 2-316 state that it was designed "to
protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer
by. . . permitting the exclusion of implied warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise."' 9 A disclaimer that does not meet section 2-316's requirements
is contrary to the public policies expressed by the drafters: to prevent
unfair surprise and harsh workings of a contract."10 The argument may

be made, however, that if the drafters had intended section 2-316 primarily to protect consumers, less concern need be given to transactions between merchants.1 1 1 Relative bargaining capacity suggests that
merchants are in less need of protection from unbargained language of

disclaimers and harsh results than are consumers.112 This argument

would conclude that because the Convention's scope includes transactions only between merchants, section 2-316 does not define requirements
for validity as to them. The language of section 2-316, however, makes

no distinction between consumers or merchants: Both are shielded from
unexpected or harsh results. Furthermore, it is not always true that a
merchant-buyer is in less need of protection than a consumer."

3

Some

109. U.C.C. § 2-316 official comment 1 (1977).
110. See id.; see also Tareyton Elec. Composition, Inc. v. Eltra Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1064, 1072-73 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (Code's drafters wished to provide
certainty by setting out requirements for disclaimers in § 2-316); Hartwig Farms, Inc. v.
Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App. 539, 545, 625 P.2d 171, 174 (1981) (purpose of § 2-316 is to protect buyers from clauses seeking to exclude all warranties);
U.C.C. § 1-102 official comment 1 (1977) (Code should be read in the light of the purpose
underlying the relevant section); cf Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.
Supp. 807, 810 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (avoidance of unfair surprise requires clear and precise
language), affid mem., 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1982); Moye, supra note 96, at 614 (purpose
of § 2-302 on unconscionable clauses is to prevent oppression and unfair surprise). Implied warranties arise by operation of law, as a matter of public policy, to protect the
buyer. Chandler v. Anchor Serum Co., 198 Kan. 571, 579, 426 P.2d 82, 89 (1967). The
same public policies that create implied warranties will work to invalidate a disclaimer
that does not comply with § 2-316.
111. See County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300,
1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affid, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); A
& M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 124
(1982); Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 261, 326 A.2d 90, 98-99
(Law Div. 1974); see also Carrington, Sales, Bulk Sales, and Documents of Title, in The
Uniform Commercial Code, Wyoming Legislative Research Committee, Research Publication No. 1, at 30, 31 (July 1960) (concern between merchants is trade convenience;
concern with consumers is fairness).
112. Parties with approximately equal bargaining power can efficiently allocate the
risks involved in the sale. See FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 419-20 (5th
Cir. 1980); Jig the Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171,
176 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976); United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449, 459-60 (E.D. Mich. 1972), affid, 509 F.2d 1043
(6th Cir. 1975); Fraass Surgical Mfg. Co. v. United States, 571 F.2d 34, 40 (Ct. Cl.
1978); Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 260, 326 A.2d 90, 98
(Law Div. 1974); Moye, supra note 96, at 597.
113. Section 2-316 refers only to "a buyer." See U.C.C. § 2-316 (1977). The only differentiation contained in the section is found in official comment 8, which speaks of "pro-
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merchants have less negotiating ability than others, and their bargaining
power may not be great. 14 Although they are not consumers, merchantbuyers ought still to be protected from unbargained language of
disclaimers.
There is a further argument that because transactions between
merchants allow for more interpretation than transactions involving a
consumer,'" 5 merchant-buyers should not be granted full protection
under the Code." 6 It is true that different standards exist in a transaction for a sale of goods between merchants. A merchant may be held to a
higher duty to read," 7 for example, and may be deemed to have noticed
the term "merchantability" in a clause that would be held to be inconspicuous if sought to be enforced against a consumer. 1 18 Yet it has already been shown that it is not the degree of interpretation permitted in a
statute that determines whether that statute sets out requirements for
effectiveness or mere guidelines for interpretation.' 9 In spite of the
higher standards applicable to merchants, section 2-316 continues to set
forth absolute mandates for valid disclaimers of implied warranties.
The public policy requirement of strict compliance with the language
of section 2-316 effectively to disclaim implied warranties comports with
the Convention's concept of validity as set out in Part I of this Note.
Only those disclaimers that fulfill the requirements of section 2-316 are
valid. "Public policy is necessarily variable [and] is evidenced by the
expression of the will of the Legislature contained in statutory enactments. . . .[W]hen [the Legislature] has expressed its will and estabfessional" and "non-professional" buyers. Id. § 2-316 official comment 8. The distinction
refers to the standards to which such a buyer will be held in making an examination of
the goods before the time of sale, for the purposes of a § 2-316(3)(b) disclaimer. Id. The
Code contains no indication that a merchant-buyer should not be protected by § 2-316.
See 2 R. Anderson, supra note 74, § 2-302:8, at 420.
114. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Fin. Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 489, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 114, 124 (1982); W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 707-09, 543
P.2d 283, 286-87 (1975); Lando, Contracts ofAdhesion and the Protection of the Weaker
Party in InternationalTrade Relations, in 2 New Directions in International Trade Law:

Written Communications and Oral Interventions 591-92 (1977).
115. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
116. Cf.U.C.C. § 2-104 official comments 1-2 (1977) (discussing transactions between
"professionals" and "non-professionals"); T. Quinn, supra note 74, 2-104[A][1)[b], at 215 (Code indicates that the rules that apply to merchants differ from those that apply to
consumers). Under this argument, the ability of the parties to negotiate is usually
thought to afford them sufficient protection. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying
text.
117. See FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 1980); Soo Line
R.R v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 n.13 (8th Cir. 1977); Fargo Mach. & Tool
Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 372 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Article Two
Warranties,supra note 92, at 184-85.

118. See FMC Fin. Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1980); Soo Line
R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1373 n.13 (8th Cir. 1977); Fargo Mach. &Tool
Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 372 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Tennessee
Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 283 N.C. 423, 434, 196 S.F2d 711, 718 (1973).
119. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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lished a new policy, courts are required to give effect to such policy."' 20
It is well recognized in private international law that certain contractual

matters, such as risk of loss clauses12 ' and Statute of Frauds,' 22 are sufficient public policy grounds for refusing to enforce a contract. A logical

extension of this reasoning would include among such grounds disclaimers of implied warranties.
III.

THE INTERACTION OF THE UCC AND THE CONVENTION:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND EFFECT

This section considers the consequences of finding a disclaimer invalid
under the Code. An invalid disclaimer must be removed from the contract.123 This result may lead to the argument that it is unreasonable to
require a foreign seller to include the word "merchantability" in a disclaimer of implied warranties because such a seller is not likely to have a
working knowledge of the Code. The rules of private international law,
however, typically will indicate that it is the law of the seller that will
control the validity of the contract.' 24 The validity of a foreign seller's
120. Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N.Y. 407, 413-14, 173 N.E. 564, 566-67

(1930).

121. See The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 265, 268-70 (1902); Oceanic Steam Nay. Co.
v. Corcoran, 9 F.2d 724, 727, 731-33 (2d Cir. 1925); Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry.,
254 N.Y. 407, 410-11, 413-15, 173 N.E. 564, 565-67 (1930).
122. Roth v. Patino, 185 Misc. 235, 237, 56 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd
mem., 270 A.D. 927, 62 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1946), rev'd mem. on other grounds, 298 N.Y.

543, 80 N.E.2d 673 (1948); Leroux v. Brown, 12 C.B. 801, 801-03, 824, 826-27, 138 Eng.
Rep. 1119, 1120-21, 1129-30 (1852).
123. See Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enockson, 240 N.W.2d 353, 355 (N.D. 1976);
U.C.C. § 2-302 & official comments 1-2 (1977); 3 R. Anderson, supra note 74, § 2-316:41,
at 353; cf.Mailand v. Burckle, 20 Cal. 3d 367, 384, 572 P.2d 1142, 1152, 143 Cal. Rptr. 1,
11 (1978) (invalid provision of franchise agreement excised); Ai v. Frank Huff Agency,
Ltd., 61 Hawaii 607, 619, 607 P.2d 1304, 1312-13 (1980) (invalid provision for attorney
fees severed); Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 533-34, 417 N.E.2d 764, 777 (1981)
(invalid fee-sharing provision severed). See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
124. Senate Hearing,supra note 2, at 67 (responses of Mr. Orban submitted for the
record); see 3 A. Ehrenzweig & E. Jayme, Private International Law §§ 369-371, at 35-37
(1977); Reinhart, supra note 1, at 90. There are situations involving an American buyer
and a foreign seller, however, in which the rules of private international law would point
to the UCC as the applicable law. The most widely recognized rule for determining a
choice of law is to decide which of several jurisdictions has the "most significant relationship to," Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(1) (1969), or is the "center of
gravity" of, H. Goodrich & E. Scoles, supra note 35, at 202, the contract. The factors
that are to be considered include the places of contracting, negotiating and performing
the contract, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(2) (1969); see Whiteside v. New Castle Mut. Ins.
Co., 595 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (D. Del. 1984); Phoenix Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 560 F.
Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Del. 1983); Rototron Corp. v. Lake Shore Burial Vault Co., 553 F.
Supp. 691, 695-96 (E.D. Wis. 1982), aft'd, 712 F.2d 1214 (7th Cir. 1983); Carriage Bags,
Ltd. v. Aerolinas Argentinas, 521 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (D. Colo. 1981); Adams Laboratories, Inc. v. Jacobs Eng'g Co., 486 F. Supp. 383, 389 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Bunge Corp. v.
Biglane, 418 F. Supp. 1159, 1164 (S.D. Miss. 1976). United States courts have applied
this rule in conflicts between the laws of two states, see, e.g., Whiteside v. New Castle
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disclaimer clause will most often be subject to scrutiny only under that
seller's domestic law. If the seller is American, requiring adherence to
section 2-316 is not burdensome because such a seller presumably will be
familiar with Code provisions. Thus, the initial effect of a determination
that a clause is invalid under the UCC is not unreasonable.
A finding of invalidity then requires an analysis of whether the clause
is severable. 2 ' The Convention contains no provision on the severability
of a contract. Under the General Provisions,' 26 therefore, the relevant
domestic law must be consulted to determine whether an invalid disclaimer clause is severable.' 2 7 Although the UCC does not address this
issue,' 2 8 section 1-103 allows for the application of common law principles to issues on which the UCC is silent.' 2 9 Thus, the determination of
Mut. Ins. Co., 595 F. Supp. 1096, 1098 (D. Del. 1984); Johnston Assocs. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 560 F. Supp. 916, 917 (D. Del. 1983); Rototron Corp. v. Lake Shore Burial
Vault Co., 553 F. Supp. 691, 695-96 (E.D. Wis. 1982), affid, 712 F.2d 1214 (7th Cir.
1983), as well as in conflicts between the laws of a state and a foreign nation, see Gulf
Trading & Transp. Co. v. The Vessel Hoegh Shield, 658 F.2d 363, 366-67 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert denied, 457 U.S. 1119 (1982); Phoenix Can. Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 560 F. Supp.
1372, 1379 (D. Del. 1983); Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1113,
1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Carriage Bags, Ltd. v. Aerolinas Argentinas, 521 F. Supp. 1363,
1366-67 (D. Colo. 1981); Edinburgh Assurance Co. v. R.L. Burns Corp., 479 F. Supp.
138, 150, 152-54 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part on other
grounds, 669 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1982). If a foreign seller is bound by the UCC, it is
because a tribunal has declared that under the rules of private international law, the UCC
is the law with the most significant relationship to the transaction. In such a situation, the
foreign seller has a sufficient relationship to the United States to justify his being bound
by American law. The parties are always free to include a choice of law clause in their
contract. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. It is unclear whether a clause stating
that the law of a particular country applies to a contract is an implied exclusion of the
Convention under article 6, or even whether such an exclusion would be effective. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text. If the choice of law clause operates as an exclusion
of the Convention, there is no difficulty in deciding the validity of the disclaimer clause:
Such a determination is made according to the chosen law. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. If the choice of law clause does not effectively exclude the Convention,
however, that law will still be applicable to those areas of the contract to which the
Convention does not apply. See generally Dore, Choice of Law Under the International
Sales Convention: A U.S. Perspective, 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 521, 525-39 (1983) (discussing
jurisdictions of Code and Convention in different choice of law situations). Thus, the
validity of the disclaimer clause will still be made according to the domestic law chosen
by the parties.
125. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 11-27, at 430 (2d ed. 1977).
If an invalid contract clause is not severable, the entire contract must fall. See infra notes
128-35 and accompanying text.
126. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2), at 3, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 673 (1980).
127. Because there is no Convention provision on severability, such questions must be
answered first "in conformity with the general principles on which [the Convention] is
based." Id., reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 673. A determination of these general principles
has proved unworkable. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. In the absence of
general principles, matters are to be settled "in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law." Id., reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 673. Thus,
the applicable domestic law governs the severability of an invalid disclaimer clause.
128. Section 1-108 pertains to the severability of the UCC itself, not of any contract
governed by the Code. See U.C.C. § 1-108 (1977).
129. See id. § 1-103.
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severability must be made under the common law.
The general rule is that the severability of a contract containing an

unenforceable clause depends first on whether the remaining contract
may be apportioned into corresponding, equivalent pairs of part perform3

ances, at least one pair of which does not contravene public policy.'

0

If

31

this is so, the invalid clause is usually severable.1 The remainder of the
contract will be enforced unless it is further determined that the parties
32
would not have made the contract without the offending provision.

Although it is unlikely that a contract without a warranty disclaimer

would contravene public policy, 133 whether the parties would have entered into the agreement
without the disclaimer must be determined on
34
the facts of each case.1
If the contract is enforceable without the invalid disclaimer, the question becomes whether the UCC or the Convention should be applied to
fill the gap created by the severance. 35 The argument can be made that
because the Convention has no application to matters of validity, the do-

mestic law under which the invalid provision was stricken should provide
the gap filler. Once the offending clause is excised from the contract,
however, there is no longer any issue of validity from which the Convention is excluded; therefore, it is natural that the Convention should fill
130. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 183, 240 (1979); see E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 5.1, at 327, § 5.8, at 359-61, § 8.13, at 596-99 (1982); Restatement of Contracts
§§ 266(3), 599-607 (1932); see, e.g., Reilly v. Korholz, 137 Colo. 20, 27, 320 P.2d 756,
760 (1958); Carter v. Thompkins, 133 Colo. 279, 282-84, 294 P.2d 265, 267 (1956);
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 91 Idaho 544, 547, 428 P.2d 50, 53 (1967).
131. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utils., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624, 634-36 (D.
Wyo. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 673 F.2d 323, 324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
989 (1982); Mailand v. Burckle, 20 Cal. 3d 367, 384, 572 P.2d 1142, 1152, 143 Cal. Rptr.
1, 11 (1978); Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 705, 71214, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149-50, 155 (1980); Corti v. Fleisher, 93 Ill. App. 3d 517, 533-34,
417 N.E.2d 764, 777 (1981); Morse v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 344 So. 2d 1353, 137071 (La. 1977); Peeples v. City of Detroit, 99 Mich. App. 285, 295-96, 297 N.W.2d 839,
843 (1980); Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696, 701 (S.D. 1982); Williams v.
Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978); Tate v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 647
P.2d 58, 61-62 (Wyo. 1982).
132. See LeBouef v. Liner, 396 So. 2d 376, 378 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Peeples v. City of
Detroit, 99 Mich. App. 285, 296, 297 N.W.2d 839, 843 (1980); Williams v. Williams, 569
S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978); McFarland v. Haby, 589 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979).
133. Courts typically find invalid disclaimer clauses to be severable, and enforce the
agreement as if the attempts to disclaim had not been made. See, e.g., Entron, Inc. v.
General Cablevision, 435 F.2d 995, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1970); Jameson Chem. Co. v. Love,
401 N.E.2d 41, 47-48 (Ind. Ct. App.), modified on other grounds, 403 N.E.2d 928 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980); Discount Drug Corp. v. Honeywell Protection Servs., 303 Pa. Super.
522, 525-26, 450 A.2d 49, 50-51 (1982); Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696,
701 (S.D. 1982).
134. See, e.g., LeBouef v. Liner, 396 So. 2d 376, 378 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Williams v.
Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Tex. 1978); McFarland v. Haby, 589 S.W.2d 521, 524
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
135. See Schlechtriem, supra note 14, § 6.01, at 6-4. A body of law is needed to fill the
void. The choice is between the domestic law that invalidated the provision and the
Convention. Kahn, supra note 38, at 956.
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the gap caused by severance.136 Additionally, because national laws are
considered to be weaker than international norms, 13 7 the UCC should go
no further than determining the validity of the disclaimer clause.) 38 The
gap that application of section 2-316 has created should therefore be
filled with the Convention provisions governing the issue of conformity
of the goods.
The pertinent provision is article 35, which states that "[e]xcept where
the parties have agreed otherwise,"' 39 goods are nonconforming unless
they "are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description
would ordinarily be used,"" 4 "are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract,"''4 "possess the qualities of goods which the seller
has held out to the buyer as a sample or model,"' 4 2 and "are contained or
packaged in the manner usual for such goods or. . .in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods." ' 3 Because there is no longer
an "agreement otherwise" after the invalid disclaimer has been removed,
these implied warranties should fill the gap created by application of section 2-316. If the goods do not meet these requirements, they are nonconforming." 4 The seller will be liable for any nonconforming goods
because he has made no effective disclaimer of liability.' 4 5
CONCLUSION

The Convention does not apply to any issues of validity of the contract
or its terms. Validity under the Convention includes matters of public
policy as defined by mandatory rules of domestic laws. The Convention
leaves these matters to the applicable domestic law. The UCC's disclaimer of warranty provisions set forth requirements for validity within
the Convention's concept of that term. Section 2-316's mandatory language and public policy purposes compel this conclusion. Finding a disclaimer invalid under the Code leads to severance of that clause under
the common law. The resulting gap in the contract should be filled by
the pertinent provisions of the Convention.
Laura E. Longobardi
136. See Schlechtriem, supra note 14, § 6.01, at 6-4. Quality standards of the goods
and liability for nonconformity are issues squarely within the Convention's scope. See J.
Honnold, supra note 1, § 73, at 102, §§ 222-229, at 249-56, §§ 241-243, at 267-68.
137. Schlechtriem, supra note 14, § 6.01, at 6-4.
138. See J. Honnold, supra note 1, § 233, at 258; Schlechtriem, supra note 14, § 6.01,
at 6-4.
139. CISG, supra note 1, art. 35(2), at 11, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668, 679 (1980).
140. Id art. 35(2)(a), at 11, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 679.
141. Id. art. 35(2)(b), at 11, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 679.
142. Id. art. 35(2)(c), at 11, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. at 679.
143. Id. art. 35(2)(d), at 11, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. at 679.
144. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
145. The seller will be liable under article 36 of the Convention. See CISG, supra note
1, art. 36, at 11, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 668, 679 (1980).

